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ORAN R. YOUNG*

Rights, Rules, and Common Pools:
Solving Problems Arising in
Human/Environment Relations
We are in danger of choking on the cascade of conceptual
distinctions social scientists have devised to frame questions and guide
analysis concerning interactions between human users and natural
resources and environmental services. Some analysts focus on the
properties of goods and services (e.g., excludability and rivalness) and
speak of common-pool resources and public goods without recognizing that
these phenomena are to a considerable degree socially constructed. Others
direct attention to attributes of management systems or resource regimes
(e.g., structures of property rights), without realizing that the performance
of these systems is affected by the character of the goods and services to
which they pertain. Still others seek to understand the formation and
performance of environmental or resource regimes without taking into
account the fundamental distinction between dominium and imperium in
considering the role of the state in such governance systems. Not
surprisingly, some analysts simply refer to the commons in generic terms
(e.g., the tragedy of the commons, governing the commons) without making
any sustained effort to address the conceptual issues referred to in the
preceding sentences. Small wonder, then, that analysts and practitioners
alike often find themselves enmeshed in a conceptual labyrinth that they are
unable to navigate successfully and yet are powerless to change.
What can we do to alleviate this problem and, in the process, to
facilitate a productive dialogue among those striving to understand and
ultimately to guide human/environment relations in a variety of settings?
One possibility, of course, would be to scrap the existing suite of conceptual
distinctions in the hope of starting fresh with a more straightforward and
coherent framework for analyzing these matters. But the prospects for
pursuing this avenue successfully are, to put it mildly, slim. The existing
concepts all have articulate proponents, and there is no mechanism through
which the community of analysts working in this field could select and
implement a new conceptual system, even if there were a desire to do so.
In this essay, therefore, I explore a second option, seeking to distinguish the
major concepts in use today from one another as sharply and as precisely
as possible and explaining why it is helpful to seek clarity regarding such
matters by describing some of the more interesting lines of thought that

* Oran R. Young is a professor at the Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and
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come into focus once the prevailing terminological fog is lifted. Along the
way, I refer to issues ranging from the conservation of local stocks of fish to
the regulation of emissions of greenhouse gases to illustrate the scope of the
domain to which this discussion pertains.
I. TYPES OF GOODS AND SERVICES
Most of us are familiar with the variables known as excludability
and rivalness (or subtractability) used to differentiate major types of goods
and services.' Dichotomizing each of these variables produces the wellknown 2x2 matrix depicted in Figure 1. Goods that are rival but excludable
constitute the traditional category of private goods. The opposite pattern,
encompassing goods that are both non-excludable and non-rival, gives rise
to what are known as public or collective goods. The other axis
encompasses goods that are non-excludable but rival or common-pool
resources and goods that are excludable but non-rival (at least to the
members of some well-defined group) and are often described as club
goods.
The distinctions underlying this figure are not only conceptually
neat; they also provide the point of departure for a number of well-known
propositions about the tragedy of the commons in the case of common-pool
resources, the free rider problem in the case of public goods, and the idea
of the public interest in the case of the side effects associated with the use
of private goods. The ensuing debates about how to avoid the tragedy of
the commons and ways to circumvent the free rider problem have
contributed significantly to our understanding of human/environment
interactions. 2 But can we rely on the basic picture of the world reflected in
the easily understood and enticing categories implicit in Figure 1?
Unfortunately, there are a number of grounds for skepticism regarding this
matter.

1. See, e.g., MANcUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECIVE ACTION (1965); ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECIVE ACTION
(1990); RIGHTS TO NATURE: ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF
INSTTTUTIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Susan Hanna et al. eds., 1996); THE DRAMA OF THE
COMMONS (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
2. MANAGING THE COMMONS 2 (John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 1998); THE
DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supranote 1.
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FIGURE 1.
TYPES OF GOODS AND SERVICES
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Private goods

Common pool resources

Club goods

Public or collective goods

In the first instance, there are conceptual pitfalls lurking in this set
of distinctions. Goods or services that are non-excludable and non-rival
(e.g., severe droughts) may actually turn out to be public "bads" in the
sense that they cause harm to those who are affected by them. More often,
particular goods are beneficial to some recipients and harmful to others, as
in the case of certain types of climate change. Goods that are identical in
material terms (e.g., swimming pools that are alike in every material
respect) may be private goods, common-pool resources, or club goods
depending upon the rules governing their use. The use of private goods
(e.g., the harvesting of trees for timber) may produce more or less severe
side effects (e.g., soil erosion, the loss of habitat for wildlife) that are
harmful to people both in the neighborhood and in areas far removed from
the site of the goods. The fact that common-pool resources are nonexcludable may never even come to the attention of users so long as the
supply is sufficient to meet the aggregate demand of the users.
Equally important is the fact that real-world situations are often
difficult to map onto the simple and sharp dichotomies embedded in Figure
1. Many goods (e.g., fish stocks, freeways, the geomagnetic spectrum) are
non-rival so long as the extent or intensity of use remains below a certain
threshold. Beyond this, rivalness may set in with a vengeance as fish stocks
become depleted, freeways suffer from congestion, and separate
broadcasting operations interfere with one another. Similarly, it is
sometimes possible to establish affordable exclusion mechanisms in the
interest of avoiding the occurrence of these problems. The construction of
various kinds of fences to protect land from the intrusion of neighbors'
cattle is a case in point. So also is the use of scramblers to prevent nonsubscribers from benefiting from radio or television programs without
paying a fee.
As these observations suggest, the most fundamental problem with
the familiar distinctions reflected in Figure 1 is that the relevant variables
are to a greater or lesser degree socially constructed or, in other words,
products of human thought and actions. Sophisticated analysts have taken
to qualifying the notion of non-excludability by saying that it refers to
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goods that cannot be made excludable at a reasonable cost.3 But this
formulation does not solve the problem. Whether a cost is reasonable or
acceptable depends upon the values of the relevant actors and the resources
at their disposal. Wealthy landowners may have the capacity and the will
to pay for exclusion mechanisms (e.g., robust fences around their land
holdings) that are simply out of reach for poor landowners. Country clubs
whose membership consists of members of the economic and social elite can
afford to hire private security guards if necessary to ensure that nonmembers cannot and do not gain access to their facilities.
Equally important is the fact that the introduction of new
technologies or new social institutions can transform a non-excludable good
into an excludable good at reasonable cost. The invention of barbed wire is
said to have had this effect with regard to the Great Plains of North
America.4 The development of affordable scramblers can do the same for
lighthouses, which some analysts have treated as quintessential examples
of public goods. Much the same is true in the case of wildlife, where royal
proclamations can and often have put wild animals off limits to ordinary
citizens, and in the case of fisheries, where the establishment of individual
transferable quotas gives rise to clear cut exclusion mechanisms. Of course,
the effectiveness of these mechanisms often depends upon the existence of
a state or some sort of public authority able and willing to enforce such
arrangements. But in the final analysis, the creation of exclusion
mechanisms is limited only by human ingenuity. It should come as no
surprise, therefore, that it is not uncommon to find goods that were once
common-pool resources or public goods migrating into the categories of
private goods and club goods.
Somewhat comparable observations are in order regarding the
attribute of rivalness. Once again, technological innovation can move a
good from the category of rival to being for all practical purposes non-rival.
Advanced broadcasting methods, for instance, have gone a long way
toward relieving competition for slots on the geomagnetic spectrum.'
Similarly, institutional inventions like the introduction of time slots
governing the use of swimming pools or tennis courts can reduce or even
eliminate congestion, even though they limit the access of individual users
in significant ways. Note also that some goods - most often public
goods -may become more valuable as the number of users or members
grows. Defense construed as a public good produced by an alliance is apt

3.
SCiENcE
4.
West, 18

Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul C. Stem, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302
1907 (2003).
Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights:A Study of the American
J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975).

5. MARK W. ZACHER & BRENT A. SUTrON, GOVERNING GLOBAL NETWORKs:
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (1996).
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to become more credible as the size of the alliance grows. And institutions
themselves treated as public goods -subjects often regard them as both
non-excludable and non-rival -can become more valuable or effective as
the number of users/subjects grows. Far from becoming rival, for instance,
electoral systems perform better as the proportion of the eligible voters
participating rises. But note in this connection that powerful actors in the
relevant societies will often see to it that institutions are structured in such
a way as to favor the interests of certain groups of subjects over others
without eliminating the attributes of non-excludability and non-rivalness.
II. STRUCTURES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Those who speak of the commons frequently have in mind concepts
relating to property rights and more particularly to arrangements to which
we often attach the label common property.6 It is perhaps unnecessary to
stress the fact that structures of property rights or, for that matter, other sets
of rights are social artifacts all the way down. Although they lack material
referents, they are no less significant as drivers of human behavior for that.
As a result, it will help to introduce some of the key distinctions relating to
property rights and to discuss their relationship to the types of goods and
services described in the preceding section.
A straightforward way to think about rights is to treat them as
entitlements that go with the occupancy of recognized roles.7 Thus, we
speak of human rights, women's rights, indigenous rights, patients' rights,
animal rights, and so forth. As this observation suggests, rights are not cast
in concrete or fixed for all time by the forces of nature. On the contrary, the
rights accorded to the occupants of specific roles can and often do vary from
one society to another and over time within the same society. The rights of
women to vote, to hold property, and even to control their own bodies, for
example, are relatively recent developments in many societies; they remain
non-existent in others. Issues pertaining to rights frequently become
battlegrounds in the political and legal arenas of individual societies.
Consider as cases in point the debates of the last 50 years in the United
States about civil rights or the longstanding debates in the world at large
regarding human rights.

6. JOHN HARKNESS DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POuCY-MAKING
AND ECONOMICS (1968); CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY,
THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994); DANIEL H. COLE, POLLuIrON AND PROPERTY:
COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2002).
7. RICHARD FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS (1976).
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Property rights, on this account, are entitlements associated with
the role of owner.8 In the crudest of terms, we typically speak of private
property where there is a single owner (which may be a legal person like a
corporation in contrast to a natural person); public property where the
owner is the state (or a government agency acting on behalf of the state),
and common property where two or more - often a sizable number - of
actors hold the property in question either as joint tenants or as tenants in
common. Cases where none of these conditions holds are often
characterized as null property, open-to-entry property, or res nullius, and
the resources covered by these arrangements are open to use by one and all
without restrictions.
What may seem simple at first blush, however, quickly becomes
more complex as we add a number of familiar concepts relating to property
and property rights. First and perhaps foremost, structures of property
rights are made up of bundles of rights that can be and often are separated
or combined in complex ways. At a minimum, these bundles include
possessory rights or the entitlements of ownership per se, usufructuary
rights or rights to make use of property in specified ways, exclusion rights
or rights to prevent others from using property without permission, and
disposition rights or rights to dispose of property according to the wishes
of the owner.
The possible combinations and permutations of these bundles of
rights are limited only by human imagination.9 A holder of use rights (e.g.,
a lessee) may not have possessory rights or exclusion rights and may enjoy
only a sharply restricted set of use rights (e.g., the right to live in a house
but not the right to sublet the house or to make alterations). Exclusion rights
are often limited by the existence of rights of way or entitlements on the
part of non-owners to pass over a piece of property for certain purposes
(e.g., getting to a landlocked house). Possessory rights can be subdivided as
in cases where owners sell or give away development rights while retaining
the rest of the bundle of entitlements, or where different parties share such
rights as in systems of common field agriculture in which one party is
entitled to grow crops on the land, while others have rights to graze cattle
on the same land once the crops have been harvested.' ° Arguably most
important of all, even relatively full bundles of rights are not unlimited or
unrestricted. Owners are not at liberty to use their property for illegal

8. HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE FIRM, VOL. 1, THE ORGANIZATION
OF ECONOMIC AcTIwTY (1988).
9. PROPERTY: CASES, CONCEPTS, CRITIQUES (Lawrence Becker & Kenneth Kipnis eds.,
1984).
10.

Bruce M.S. Campbell & Ricardo A. Godoy, Commonfield Agriculture: The Andes and

Medieval England Compared, in

MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY

99 (Daniel W. Bromley et al. eds., 1992).
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purposes (e.g., growing cannabis or opium poppies), purposes that impose
undue harm on their neighbors (e.g., grazing cattle that regularly wander
onto adjacent properties), or purposes that are deemed inappropriate by a
recognized public authority (e.g., operating a commercial business in an
area zoned for residential uses only).
Most societies impose restrictions on what can be owned and who
or what is allowed to occupy the role of owner. Although the idea of
owning other human beings is abhorrent to most people today, slavery is
an ancient institution. In some parts of the world, arrangements allowing
individuals to own other human beings flourish to this day. The distinction
between terrestrial systems and marine systems is interesting in this
context. Various forms of land ownership have emerged and played
influential roles in most societies over several thousand years. But there are
few parallel practices pertaining to marine systems or seas and oceans.
Some may regard this difference as natural, citing the facts that water is
mobile and that many marine resources are migratory. But this argument
is not entirely convincing. There is a long history, for instance, of rights to
harvest marine living resources in well-defined locations. And where
marine resources (e.g., clams or oysters) are more or less sedentary, there
is nothing to prevent the emergence of bundles of property rights whose
contents are similar to those of familiar arrangements relating to land
ownership.
What is the relationship between the types of goods and services
discussed in the preceding section and the structures of property rights
described in this section? Although there are superficial similarities between
the two sets of distinctions, these similarities begin to evaporate as soon as
we delve more deeply into the issues at stake. In cases where there is no
way to eliminate the condition of non-excludability regardless of cost, for
example, individuals have little or no incentive to establish systems of
private property. Public goods are apt to take the form of public property,
given the fact that overcoming the free-rider problem often requires some
sort of intervention on the part of the state. Common-pool resources
frequently take the form of common property, especially in settings where
the supply of the relevant goods is plentiful relative to demand, so that
there is little reason to establish exclusion mechanisms or entry barriers
designed to protect the interests of individual users.
It does not require a lot of analysis, however, to realize that there
is nothing like a perfect match between the distinctions pertaining to types
of goods and services and the distinctions among structures of property
rights. Government agencies - acting on behalf of the state - can and often
do own resources (e.g., forests and hardrock minerals) in the form of public
property that are both excludable and rival. It is not only possible but also
common in some societies to establish common property arrangements
pertaining to resources (e.g., land held in common by a group of owners)
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that are excludable and rival. And there is no shortage of mixed systems.
Consider the case of an owner of private land who does not own the
wildlife living on his land, who has limited use rights to water in a stream
flowing across his land, and who has sold the development rights to the
land to a land trust or a government agency. Or, to take another example,
think of the case of the owner of beachfront property whose private rights
extend only to the mean high tide line, who must grant access to the beach
to others under some well-established system of publicly defined rules, and
who has no rights to the fish and other marine organisms located in the
adjacent waters, even if they can be caught with land-based gear.
Equally important is the fact that plans for solving a wide range of
problems relating to the environment and natural resources commonly take
the form of proposals for altering prevailing structures of property rights
in order to eliminate perverse incentives by creating exclusion mechanisms
or, less often, by encouraging efforts to increase the supply of goods in
order to alleviate conditions of rivalness. Undoubtedly, the most familiar
examples feature efforts to avoid or alleviate conditions that give rise to the
tragedy of the commons." Well-known but divergent prescriptions, in this
context, call for a transition to private property through the creation of
exclusion mechanisms (e.g., effective fences) or for a transition to public
property through actions on the part of a government agency to claim
ownership and impose restrictions on the use of the relevant resources (e.g.,
rules governing the harvesting of wildlife). 2
Yet this is not the only condition that can give rise to proposals
calling for changes in prevailing structures of property rights. There is a
long history of arrangements that permit or even encourage the
privatization of publicly owned land and natural resources. Under the
provisions of the Mining Act of 187213 (which remains to this day the law
of the land in the United States), for instance, private individuals can stake
claims to public land and, assuming they fulfill a variety of relatively simple
requirements, eventually take title to the land in question as private
property.14 On the other hand, many societies have mechanisms for
converting private land into publicly owned land. In the United States, the
exercise of public authority in cases of this sort is known as the right of
eminent domain. In short, there is a plentiful supply of procedures for
rearranging structures of property rights, even when there is no change at
all in the biophysical properties of the goods or services in question.

11. The tragedy of the commons is actually misnamed. It ordinarily occurs under
conditions of null property in which no rules governing entry exist. There are many cases in
which structures of common property are perfectly able to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
12. MANAGING THE COMMONS, supra note 2; THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 1.
13. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (2000).
14. CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA, WHO CONTROLS PUBLIC LANDS? ch. 3 (1996).
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III. DOMINIUM VERSUS IMPERIUM
Governments acting on behalf of the state can and often do own a
great deal of property.' In some societies (e.g., Russia during the Soviet
period), there is no provision at all for private ownership of resources; the
state holds title to all the land and associated natural resources along with
most of the means of production. Even in countries in which private
property is normal and widespread, the state may hold title to a large
proportion of the land base. Between them, the federal government and the
provinces in Canada own more than 80 percent of the nation's land in the
form of crown lands. Surprising to some is the fact that even in the United
States, where the virtues of private property are regularly extolled, the
federal government alone owns about one third of the country's land base,
including 86 percent of the state of Nevada and over 60 percent of Alaska.
Although government ownership of land and natural resources is a
perennial source of controversy in many societies, there is no reason to
expect that government ownership of these resources on a large scale is
likely to disappear or even decline significantly any time soon.
Important as it is, however, ownership in the form of public
property is not the only mechanism through which the state can make
decisions affecting human uses of natural resources and environmental
services. The important distinction here centers on the contrast between
what are known traditionally as dominium and imperium. 16 Dominium is
straightforward; it refers to the full range of circumstances under which
governments or their agents hold title to land and natural resources as
forms of public property. But governments acting on behalf of the state can
take any number of steps to influence the behavior of owners, users, and
managers of property, whether they are individual holders of private
property or public agencies responsible for managing certain portions of the
public domain. Imperium, as it is often called, refers to the authority of the
state to make and implement rules and regulations that require property
owners to act in certain ways and that prohibit them from acting in other
ways.
It is easy to see that imperium is a powerful force in most societies
and that it can affect - sometimes drastically - the incentives of the holders
of both private property and common property. It is imperium that allows
government agencies acting on behalf of the state to regulate or impose
restrictions on the actions of holders of property rights. We like to believe,
especially in the case of private property, that owners are free to use their

15.
16.

RETHINKING THE PUBLIC LANDS (Sterling Brubaker ed., 1984).
BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
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property as they see fit, whether or not their choices turn out to be good or
bad. But there are obvious limitations on this freedom, and both the extent
and the depth of the resultant restrictions vary across space and time. To
take just a few prominent examples, property owners usually must apply
for permits to build on their land, comply with rules regarding the
treatment of wildlife residing on their land, and grant access to their
property to a variety of actors authorized by the state to go onto the
property.
In modern societies, restrictions imposed on property owners
through the authority granted to the state via imperium have proliferated
in many directions. But the largest categories of these restrictions and the
most significant with regard to the issues under consideration in this essay
involve zoning and taxation. Governments from the local level to the
national level place many restrictions on the activities of owners under the
rubric of zoning. Whole areas may be zoned for a single use (e.g.,
commercial or residential use); owners are subject to a wide range of rules
pertaining to the siting, design, and construction of buildings; there are
generally extensive regulations prohibiting or requiring specified actions
(e.g., respecting the rights of neighbors) on the part of owners. It is the
exercise of this authority that has given rise to intense controversies
regarding what are often called regulatory takings. All agree that the state
has the authority to impose some regulations on property owners. But how
far can the state go in imposing such restrictions before it is required to
compensate owners for the loss of value of their property? There is no
correct answer to this question. Cases involving alleged takings appear
regularly on the dockets of courts, and new decisions can affect the
threshold beyond which legitimate regulations turn into regulatory takings.
It is imperium again that gives the state the authority to levy taxes
on property. In many systems, governments - especially local governments
-rely on property taxes as their principal source of revenue. It would be
politically (as well as economically) unwise to tax property too heavily, and
government agencies frequently use taxes to pursue goals other than
securing revenue (e.g., the introduction of current-use programs to provide
land owners with incentives to maintain agricultural land). Not
surprisingly, moreover, controversies centered on property taxes regularly
make their way onto the agendas of legislatures and the dockets of courts.
Still, the fact remains that all states assert the authority to tax property not
only to raise revenue to cover the costs of their own operations but also to
influence the incentives of property owners to choose desired courses of
action.
It is interesting to observe in passing differences between systems
of land tenure and systems of sea tenure that are relevant to this discussion.
While the development of use rights to various marine resources (e.g., clam
beds, choice fishing holes) is relatively common, there are few cases in
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which actors claim full bundles of property rights -in the form of either
private property or public property-to marine systems.17 Indigenous
peoples sometimes develop complex systems of sea tenure, and the
extension of coastal state jurisdiction may gradually lead to changes
regarding sea rights. But for the moment, the authority granted as a matter
of imperium must do almost all the work in regulating human activities
affecting marine systems in such a way as to avoid socially undesirable
outcomes (e.g., severe depletions of fish stocks, marine pollution). One
interesting consequence of this situation is that governments seldom seek
to impose taxes on users of marine systems or collect royalties from the
harvesting of valuable marine resources (e.g., fish, crustaceans, kelp). In the
United States, for instance, the costs of implementing and enforcing
regulations governing the harvesting of fish far outweigh any revenue the
government derives in the form of rents, royalties, or taxes from the marine
fisheries.
IV. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER
What can we learn from this exercise in clarifying individual
concepts and sharpening distinctions among constellations of concepts
widely used in analyses of human/environment relations? Do the expected
benefits outweigh the time and energy required to clear up a variety of
misconceptions? In this section, I seek to answer these questions by taking
a new look at several issues that lie at the core of efforts to understand
human/environment relations and that have provoked long-running
controversies. Specifically, I address the tragedy of the commons, the free
rider problem, and the problem of regulatory takings.
The tragedy of the commons is not fundamentally a consequence
of reliance on common property systems. Rather, the problem to which this
concept applies occurs in situations featuring resources that are scarce in the
sense that demand exceeds supply and that do not lend themselves to the
introduction of affordable exclusion mechanisms or other restrictions on
human use. Consider a finite fish stock in this connection. So long as supply
demonstrably and reliably exceeds the demand of all the members of the
user group, the absence of rights and rules may not matter much. In other
words, a system of null property may be perfectly acceptable under these
circumstances. The problem occurs when rising demand exceeds supply.
Now, individual users will experience perverse incentives to harvest as
many fish as they can because they are aware that other members of the

17.

ROGNVALDUR HANNESSON, THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE OCEANS (2004).
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group will harvest any fish they leave. 8 For the same reason, individual
users will have no incentive to reserve a certain quantity of fish to ensure
that the stock remains healthy and productive over time.
What is to be done? It turns out that any of a number of
institutional arrangements can solve or at least mitigate this problem.
Institutional innovation in such forms as individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) can create a form of private property and, in the process, alleviate the
perverse incentives arising from the condition of non-excludability. But this
is not the only way to alleviate conditions conducive to the tragedy of the
commons. The creation of public property or at least arrangements
encompassing rights to control use through the exercise of regulatory
authority can serve to avoid the tragedy of the commons. In effect,
government agencies can impose a wide array of restrictions on the actions
of resource users, including the introduction of ITQs, if that is deemed
desirable in specific situations. Common property systems also can and
often do give rise to restrictions on the behavior of individual users that
serve to avoid or alleviate the tragedy of the commons. In effect, the owners
of common property can decide as a group to impose certain rules or
restrictions on the actions of individual members of the group in the interest
of eliminating the perverse incentives associated with the condition of nonexcludability.
Granted, there are a number of ways to create and implement the
exclusion mechanisms needed to avoid the tragedy of the commons. But is
one system somehow superior to the others?19 Proponents of private
property, public property, and common property all believe in the virtues
of their preferred solution. Each option has its attractions. But each also can
cause serious trouble. Privatization can lead to outcomes that are grossly
unfair. Governments often lack both the capacity and the will to manage
public property well. Common property systems work best in situations
where the sense of community is strong and social pressure is capable of
controlling behavior effectively. Similarly, biophysical conditions may make
one or another of these approaches (in)effective. Where extensive areas are
required to implement ecosystem-based management, private property
does not work well as a means of avoiding the tragedy of the commons.
When the areas involved are large and government agencies are poorly
endowed with capacity and resources, individual users may exploit the
relevant resources without worrying about the impact of enforcement

18. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common PropertyResource: The Fishery,62 J.
POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
19.

NEIL KOMAsAR, LAW's LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF

RIGHTS (2001); COLE, supranote 6.
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operations. And common property arrangements are generally inadequate
to manage human uses of highly migratory resources.
Although it is possible to use similar analytic models to analyze the
two situations, the free rider problem presents a challenge that is quite
distinct from the tragedy of the commons. Whereas the tragedy of the
commons has to do with perverse incentives that lead users to overexploit
natural resources, the free rider problem centers on the lack of incentives
needed to induce individual actors to contribute toward supplying a public
good (e.g., cleaner air, an intact stratospheric ozone layer, forests that can
support biological diversity, healthy stocks of fish). Even in cases where
taking effective action to produce a public good will lead to Pareto superior
outcomes, individual members of the group can and often do reason that
they will be even better off if the contributions of others are sufficient to
ensure that the good is supplied, while they withhold their own
contributions. If most members of the group reason in this reflexive way,
the result will be either a failure to supply the good altogether or, at best,
a Pareto inferior level of supply.
Several responses to this problem have been discussed at length in
the literature.2' If the group is privileged in the sense that one member alone
values the good more than the cost of producing it, the free rider problem
may become irrelevant. Selective incentives in the form of excludable goods
(e.g., permits to use a wilderness area) may suffice to elicit contributions
from individuals that are sufficient to produce the public good in question
(e.g., maintaining the ecological integrity of the wilderness). In cases where
individual members of the group are influenced by the logic of
appropriateness in contrast to the logic of consequences, they may feel
obligated to contribute their fair share of the cost of supplying a public
good, regardless of the existence of the perverse incentives underlying the
free rider problem.21
In many cases, however, the solution to the free rider problem will
take the form of an exercise of imperium on the part of a government
agency acting on behalf of the state. Fundamentally, in other words, this is
a matter to be dealt with via regulatory authority rather than a matter of
creating or exercising property rights. Consider in this light cases in which
the state imposes restrictions on owners or operators of power plants in the
interest of producing clean air or on timber companies in the interest of
maintaining the integrity of ecosystems surrounding areas subject to
logging. Clean air and properly managed ecosystems are, more often than
not, public goods. But there is no sense here that the solution to the free

20. OLSON, supra note 1.
21. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The InstitutionalDynamics of InternationalPolitical
Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943 (1998).
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rider problem lies in replacing existing structures of property rights. Rather,
the most effective approach often lies in imposing restrictions designed to
change the incentives of relevant owners, whether they are holders of
private property, common property, or even public property.
The problem of regulatory takings grows out of legitimate efforts
on the part of the state to regulate the behavior of owners of private
property or even common property. The root of the problem here is that
owners of private or common property can and often do act in ways that
produce side effects or externalities that are harmful to others. Sometimes
these side effects are more or less local in character. Classic cases involve
grazing cattle that damage the neighbors' crops, carrying out commercial
activities that pollute the neighbors' drinking water, or constructing eyesore
structures that ruin the neighbors' views. But negative externalities can also
occur on a much larger scale. The erection of tall smokestacks to fulfill
requirements relating to local air pollution, for example, is a major source
of long-range transboundary air pollution. Ultimately, global problems like
climate change arise from the same sort of perverse incentives. Until and
unless restrictions are imposed, owners of private or common property
have no incentive to internalize the costs of external effects arising from
their efforts to use their property in pursuit of their own goals.
One approach to solving or at least alleviating this problem is to
augment bundles of property rights in such a way as to incorporate duties
requiring the avoidance of injuries to others into use and disposition rights.
In fact, this approach is widely employed from the local level right up to the
level of international society. Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration2 - repeated as Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration' - for
instance, reads in part that "States have.. the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."24 As in many
other walks of life, however, property owners have perverse incentives to
deemphasize the concerns of neighbors in their efforts to maximize net
gains for themselves accruing from the use of their property. And this
tendency ordinarily becomes stronger as the neighbors become more
distant in space or time and the contributions to relevant side effects caused
by individual owners become harder to separate from those of others. Small

22. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, June 16,1972,
UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14, princ. 21, 11 ILM 1416 (1972).
23. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, June 14,1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, princ. 2,31 ILM 874 (1992).
24. Id. at 876.
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wonder, then, that it is hard to impose duties on owners of private property
that are effective in avoiding global problems like the depletion of
stratospheric ozone or severe disruptions of the Earth's climate system.
Under the circumstances, there is an understandable tendency to
turn to the state, calling for the exercise of regulatory authority to impose
restrictions on the actions of property owners that cause more or less severe
damage to others. 2 Early on when the capacity of owners to harm others
was limited largely to local impacts, governments developed and made use
of the nuisance doctrine to protect adjacent property owners together with
doctrines involving the common good to protect larger public interests from
the harmful side effects of the activities of private property owners. But in
this age of long-range impacts and interference in global systems, such
doctrines are incapable of coming to terms with the consequences of
harmful side effects. As a result, regulatory restrictions have become more
stringent, and public authorities imposing these restrictions have become
more distant from the actors whose behavior they seek to influence. Both
of these developments have caused serious problems. Stringent restrictions
lead to complaints about regulatory takings and growing pressure to find
ways to safeguard the rights of property owners as well as to protect the
interests of the general public. Distance makes it harder and harder for
regulators to devise restrictions that are sensitive to local conditions. There
is no simple-much less correct -response to either problem. Those
responsible for protecting rights and imposing rules must seek to strike a
proper balance on a case-by-case basis.
V. CONCLUSION
What are the take home messages arising from this effort to sharpen
distinctions and use them to shed light on a range of familiar problems?
Two answers to this question seem particularly compelling. First, it is clear
that in efforts to solve a variety of classic problems associated with
human/environment relations not only does one size not fit all, but also
there are apt to be multiple approaches to the development of solutions.26
To take a single example, any effort to avoid or alleviate the tragedy of the
commons must include the creation of some sort of exclusion mechanism
or system for rationing available supplies of the relevant good(s) or
service(s) among prospective users. But it turns out that there are distinctive
ways to meet this condition under structures of private property, common
property, or public property. This is not to say that there are no differences

25. CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONSIDERING THE REGULATORY
STATE (1990).
26. KOMASAR, supra note 19.
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among the various strategies available for solving such problems. A number
of solutions that perform more or less equally well from the perspective of
conservation may differ considerably in terms of other criteria like
efficiency, equity, or robustness. What this means is that those responsible
for managing human/environment relations will want to start out with an
effort to diagnose the problem, seeking to identify the main features or
characteristics of the situation at hand.27 They will then be in a position to
consider the pros and cons of a range of possible solutions and to select the
solution that offers the best fit with the characteristics of the case under
consideration.
Beyond this, it is essential to bear in mind that we have entered an
era of human-dominated ecosystems.28 There is ample evidence to support
the conclusion that human actions have played an important role in the
dynamics of ecosystems - especially local systems - for some thousands of
years. Yet it is indisputable that human actions today have become major
driving forces in large-scale ecosystems, including a number of the Earth's
essential life support systems. The role of human actions as drivers in
planetary processes such as the depletion of stratospheric ozone, the loss of
biological diversity, and disturbances of the Earth's climate system are only
the most familiar of these large-scale phenomena. The implication of this
development is that we must accord the highest priority to efforts to solve
or avoid the tragedy of the commons, the free rider problem, and the
harmful impacts of side effects as they arise in connection with human/
environment relations. For the most part, success in this endeavor will
depend on our ability both to understand the sources of perverse incentives
and to devise systems of rights and rules or, in other words, governance
systems capable of altering incentives sufficiently to alleviate problems of
this sort. Some governance systems dealing with human/ environment
relations are far more effective or successful than others; there is no
guarantee that our efforts to solve problems of this sort in specific cases will
produce the desired results. Nonetheless, there is no substitute for
broadening and deepening our understanding of the nature of these
arrangements along with the factors that control their performance under
real-world conditions. This in turn means that we need to sharpen our tools
and to minimize misunderstandings attributable to confusion relating to
key concepts, like rights, rules, and common pools.
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